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IV. Border control: a new frontier for automated 
decision making and profiling?
Valeria Ferraris
Introduction: Borders, Bodies and Databases
Borders seemed to lose most of their significance after 1989, but then, after 
9/11, all of a sudden – they were back on the agenda. Borders were once again 
performing the role they first acquired in the 20th century: as barriers against 
terrorism and to prevent other violations of security.
In Europe, this new centrality of borders was accompanied by an increasing 
harmonisation of the European migration policy framework and the growing 
relevance of risk-based approaches in many policy fields e.g., policing, justice, 
welfare and immigration (see Feeley and Simon 1992, Ericson and Haggerty 
1997).
Borders are one of the privileged arenas for implementing risk-based strategies. 
They have increasingly become a tool of classification aimed at sorting 
individuals into deserving and undeserving foreigners (see Bosworth 2008, 
200). Technology adds a new complexity to this action of sorting, as it enables 
automated profiling. It means that in the future the classification between 
different categories of foreigners could be left to algorithms and automatic 
procedures rather than to the reasoning of border agents. This could decrease the 
opportunity for the person being profiled of contesting the decision. In addition 
to this future development, the nature of borders has also changed, as they have 
become gradually more mobile, in a way that was unforeseeable just a few years 
ago. The concept of mobile borders (see Weber 2006) focuses on the different 
strategies developed by receiving countries to prevent and deter unwelcome 
arrivals of migrants. They are not new border control measures but strategies of 
manipulation of the “location and meaning of borders themselves” (Weber 2006, 
22). These include, according to Weber, three different ways of border-shifting – 
functionally, spatially and temporally – plus a fourth one, the personalised border, 
when the foreigner embodies the border.
The functional shift occurs when the border is not the sole location where 
border functions are performed. Migration control is not confined to the border 
as a geographical site but is a combination of checks implemented inside and 
outside a country. The spatial shift refers to the removal of a part of a country’s 
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territory,1 whereas the temporal shift underlines that for a specific period of 
time the border is moved somewhere else. The personalised border has been 
conceptualised as “fragmented and fully portable, its location defined, not by sites 
of enforcement action by state officials, but in terms of the current whereabouts 
of certain intending visitors” (Weber 2006, 36), in other words, as a border 
that would-be migrants incorporate and carry around, regardless of where the 
functional or spatial boundary lies.
Technology plays a significant part in personalising borders. Border control is a 
challenging task because of the mobility of its targets. As effectively underlined 
by Koslowski (2011, 7), “border control officers often compare their task to 
squeezing a balloon: if you squeeze one end, it expands at the other”. Technology 
is often presented as a solution to this problem, especially by policy makers and 
the security industry. Databases are promoted as efficient tools to track migrants 
and by that persistently make them accessible for border control functions. Thus 
the exchange of information via databases has been one of the frontiers for 
migration control over the last 15 years (see Zolberg 1997). This paper seeks 
to draw attention to one specific aspect of this subject, namely the issue of 
automated decision making and profiling, in order to understand whether and 
to what extent the new strategies of immigration control involve such measures. 
In particular, this study focuses on the newly developed Schengen Information 
System II and on Eurodac, examining how these databases are implemented and 
used in Italy for immigration control. The databases, especially the SIS II, will 
not be entirely explored. The discussion will focus on aspects concerning the 
control of Third Country Nationals (TCNs). The choice of Italy is due to its 
centrality as a gateway to Europe from the South. This role has expanded with 
the Italian border being placed under increasing pressure as a consequence of the 
crisis in Northern Africa and the Middle East.
Sections one and two draw attention to the main features of SIS II and Eurodac, 
examining their implementation in Italy and their daily use by immigration 
offices. Section three explores further developments at EU level in the so-called 
smart borders package and other initiatives aimed at increasing surveillance in 
the Mediterranean area. The last section provides some reflections on profiling 
and automated decision making in border control.
This research is exploratory in nature. The issue of automated decision making 
and profiling is fairly new and has not been described in depth in relation to 
immigration databases, in particular not in terms of how they are applied in 
1 Australia is the land of experimentation in this extreme practice. Since 2001 Australia 
has excised some northern islands from the so-called migration zone (area where people 
landing by boat, have the possibility to apply for asylum and have access to the Australian 
judicial system) declaring them ‘excised offshore places’ and, as a consequence, putting the 
migrants who land there in a legal no man’s land. (see Coombs 2004; Ferraris 2014).
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practice. Some contributions (Broeders and Hampshire 2013, Bigo et al. 2012) 
have pointed out, but not explored in detail, that the logic of profiling and data 
mining pertains to these EU databases and represents a risk for fundamental 
rights infringements. Other scholars (Brouwer 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Karanja 
2008) have focused their attention on the risks of infringements of fundamental 
rights and remedies analysing the implementation of the SIS databases in some 
EU countries (France, Germany, The Netherlands). Also worth mentioning is 
the research carried out by the National Ombudsman of the Netherlands, the 
only public body to have conducted an assessment of the implementation of the 
SIS database in the Netherlands (De Nationale Ombudsman 2010).
The research was conducted through fieldwork and desk research. Before starting 
the fieldwork, legal texts at EU and country level together with the relevant 
literature were reviewed. The empirical research relies mainly on individual or 
group interviews with MEPs (3), the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) assistant supervisor, lawyers (4), the head of the EU Commission - DG 
Home Affairs - Unit A3 - Police cooperation and relations with EUROPOL 
and the European Police College (CEPOL) (1), the Italian Data Protection 
Authority (DPA), police authorities at a central and local level (Italian National 
SIS Division, Immigration office of two cities in Italy). The Italian SIRENE 
Office refused the interview.
It is worth mentioning that we encountered some difficulties with gaining access 
to the information and obtaining authorisation to perform the interviews. Most 
likely, these difficulties were due to the fact that the topic concerns police databases 
and so specific authorisations or additional checks were necessary. Although this 
does not limit the generalisability of the findings, it does mean we were only 
able to draw a partial picture of the situation. As already underlined, this study is 
exploratory in nature. The issues raised certainly require further in-depth analysis.
1. The Schengen Information System (SIS)
The Schengen Information System (SIS)2 is the oldest and most comprehensive 
large-scale database in the European Union. It was originally created as a 
compensatory measure to allow for the free movement of persons in the 
Schengen area. Furthermore it enhances cooperation and coordination between 
the police and the judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal security by 
countering illegal migration and fighting crime, namely organized crime.
It was operational from the entry into force in 1995 of the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement - hereafter Schengen Convention or 
CISA - until its replacement (on 9 April 2013) by the new information system 
2 For an overview of border control systems see Peers 2011.
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SIS II,3 which has more functions and allows the expansion of the original SIS 
to the new Member States.
The switch to SIS II occurred in response to two main issues: the inclusion of 
new Member States, which required a new IT infrastructure, and the need for 
new functionalities. The new system also involves changes in the supervision and 
management of the database. A coordinated structure of the national DPAs and 
the EDPS now supervises SIS II and has replaced the Schengen Joint Supervisory 
Authority (JSA), which supervised the Schengen Information System up to 
2013.
The new European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) assumed the 
operational management of SIS II on 9 May 2013.
SIS II has a dual legal basis, formerly falling under the first and third EU pillars: a 
Decision (2007/533/JHA), which focuses on the use of the system for policing 
and criminal law purposes, and a Regulation (No. 1987/2006) that implements 
the rules on immigration matters.4
Its purpose “shall be to ensure a high level of security within the area of freedom, 
security and justice of the European Union, including the maintenance of public 
security and public policy and the safeguarding of security in the territories 
of the Member States, and to apply the provisions of Title IV of Part Three 
of the Treaty relating to the movement of persons in their territories” (Article 
1, Regulation No. 1987/2006; Decision 2007/533/JHA). Compared to the 
purpose laid down in the Schengen Convention5 the objective appears wider 
and more ambitious, moving forward from a largely administrative purpose for 
which the Schengen Information System had been established to one of a more 
general policy.
1.1 The data stored and the alerts
The SIS contains entries (called alerts) on objects or persons, according to the 
dual legal basis (Decision 2007/533/JHA and Regulation No. 1987/2006). 
Objects include: motor vehicles, boats, aircraft; firearms; stolen, misappropriated 
3 For a critical view on the development of SIS II and the actors involved see Parkin 2011. 
4 Another regulation is on the use of SIS II by vehicle registration authorities.
5 The general purpose of the Schengen Information System is described in Article 92 as: 
“the SIS shall enable the authorities (…) by means of an automated search procedure, to 
have access to alerts on persons and property for the purposes of border checks and other 
police and customs checks”. In the case of the specific category of alerts referred to in 
Article 96, the purpose is the issuing of visas, residence permits and the administration of 
legislation on aliens.
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or lost official documents, identity papers, residence permits, travel documents, 
banknotes etc. (see Article 100, CISA; Article 38, Decision 2007/533/GAI).
Persons include:
•	 persons wanted for arrest for surrender or extradition purposes (Article 95, 
CISA; Article 26, Decision 2007/533/GAI);
•	 unwanted Third Country Nationals (Article 96, CISA; Article 24, Regulation 
No. 1987/2006);
•	 missing persons (Article 97, CISA; Article 32, Decision/2007/533/GAI);
•	 persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure (Article 98, CISA; Article 
34 of Decision 2007/533/GAI);
•	 persons for discreet surveillance or specific checks (Article 99, CISA; Article 
36, Decision 2007/533/GAI).
Over the last five years the number of alerts entered for persons has been about 
900,000 per year (and more than 10 million for objects). The overwhelming 
majority of alerts on persons are in respect of unwanted Third Country Nationals. 
However, compared to 1999, the number of alerts issued under Article 24 of the 
Regulation has decreased and all those related to police investigation or judicial 
proceedings have increased.
Table No. 1 - Alerts issued according to type
Type of alert 01/01/13 01/01/10 01/01/07 01/01/03 1/1/1999
N. % N. % N. % N. % N. %
Wanted for arrest/ 
extradition
35,919 4.05 28,666 3.08 16,047 1.79 14,023 1.60 10,491 1.23
Unwanted TCNs 659,347 74.43 736,868 79.27 752,338 84.08 780,992 88.99 764,851 89.36
Missing persons 57,302 6.47 52,319 5.63 42,500 4.75 32,211 3.67 27,436 3.21
Arrest in view of a 
judicial procedure
94,292 10.64 78,869 8.48 50,616 5.66 34,413 3.92 35,806 4.18
Discreet or specific 
checks
38,947 4.40 32,824 3.53 33,275 3.72 16,016 1.82 17,365 2.03
Total 885,807 929,546 894,776 877,655 855,949
Source: own elaboration of EU Council data
Iv. border conTrol: a new fronTIer for auTomaTed decIsIon makIng and ProfIlIng?
94
Graph No. 1 – Issued alerts according to type
Source: own elaboration of EU Council data
In contrast to the original SIS, SIS II also contains biometric data (see table 
No. 2. below). The legal basis requires a specific quality check of biometrics 
to be determined according to an identified procedure. However, there are no 
common obligations or requirements related to biometric data.
Biometric data are currently only used to confirm the identity of a Third 
Country National who has been located as a result of an alphanumeric search in 
SIS II. As soon as this becomes technically possible, fingerprints may also be used 
to identify a person on the basis of the biometric identifier.
Before this functionality is implemented, the Commission shall present a report 
on the availability and readiness of the required technology, on which the 
European Parliament shall be consulted. But there will be no further vote on 
this new functionality. As soon as it becomes technically possible to compare 
the biometric data of an unidentified person with all the biometric data in the 
database (the so called “one to many” search), it will also be in compliance with 
the law (see Article 22 of the Regulation and of the Decision listed below).
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Table No. 2 Data stored: evolution from the CISA to the present rules
CISA
Article 22  
Regulation No. 1987/2006
Article 20  
Decision 2007/533/GAI
(a) surname and forenames, any 
aliases possibly entered separately;
(b) any specific objective physical 
characteristics not subject to change;
(c) first letter of second forename;
(d) date and place of birth;
(e) sex;
(f) nationality;
(g) whether the persons concerned 
are armed;
(h) whether the persons concerned 
are violent;
(i) reason for the alert;
(j) action to be taken.
a) surname(s) and forename(s), 
name(s) at birth and previously 
used names and any aliases, which 
may be entered separately;
(b) any specific, objective, physical 
characteristics not subject to change;
(c) place and date of birth;
(d) sex;
(e) photographs;
(f) fingerprints;
(g) nationality(ies);
(h) whether the person concerned is 
armed, violent or has escaped;
(i) reason for the alert;
(j) authority issuing the alert;
(k) a reference to the decision giving rise 
to the alert;
(l) action to be taken;
(m) link(s) to other alerts issued in SIS II 
in accordance with Article 37.
(a) surname(s) and forename(s), 
name(s) at birth and previously used 
names and any aliases which may be 
entered separately;
(b) any specific, objective, physical 
characteristics not subject to change;
(c) place and date of birth;
(d) sex;
(e) photographs;
(f) fingerprints;
(g) nationality(ies);
(h) whether the person concerned is 
armed, violent or has escaped;
(i) reason for the alert;
(j) authority issuing the alert;
(k) a reference to the decision giving rise 
to the alert;
(l) action to be taken;
(m) link(s) to other alerts issued in SIS 
II pursuant to Article 52; (n) the type 
of offence.
* In Italics the new data included under the Regulation and under the Decision that were 
not included under the CISA.
As shown in the table, the two other new pieces of data included in the SIS II 
system, besides biometric data, are a reference to the decision giving rise to the 
alert and links between alerts.
The reference to the legal basis of the alert should make it possible to check its 
legitimacy more quickly. But the links between alerts are the most relevant and 
sensitive novelty. This functionality allows one alert to be associated with another. 
The sensitiveness of such links was well stressed in the EDPS opinion on SIS 
II: “Interlinking of alerts can have a major impact on the rights of the person 
concerned, since the person is no longer ‘assessed’ on the basis of data relating only 
to him/her, but on the basis of his/her possible association with other persons. 
Individuals whose data are linked to those of criminals or wanted persons are likely 
to be treated with more suspicion than others. Interlinking of alerts furthermore 
represents an extension of the investigative powers of the original SIS because it 
will make possible the registration of alleged gangs or networks (if, for instance, 
data on illegal immigrants are linked with data of traffickers)” (EDPS 2005). To 
give an example: an alert for an unwanted TCN could be linked to an alert for a 
stolen vehicle where the person was found. If there was another person in the car, 
these two persons would be linked by the alert on the vehicle.
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The eu-LISA statistical report presents the composition of the SIS II database6 on 
31 December 2013. Italy is the country with the highest number of alerts entered 
into the system, followed by Germany (with less than ½ of the Italian alerts) and 
the Netherlands and Spain (with less than ¼ of the alerts). As regards persons, Italy 
and France have the highest numbers, followed by Germany and Greece.
Table No. 3 – Numbers of alerts by country
COUNTRY Persons Documents 
(issued and 
blank)
Vehicles Licence 
plates 
Firearms Others* Total
Italy 294,101 13,819,029 1,143,745 471,905 51,511 387,539 16,167,830
France 125,058 2,263,170 326,824 1 32,557 35,319 2,782,929
Germany 76,302 6,230,209 234,818 626,111 148,227 204,133 7,519,800
Spain 71,454 3,187,767 632,581 380 45,848 764 3,938,794
Greece 65,885 396,640 165,303 119,017 14,433 28,301 789,579
Poland 29,953 679,061 210,721 144,712 17,121 3,247 1,084,815
Switzerland 29,386 828,930 21,175 9,780 1,460 890,731
Austria 27,043 317,438 24,999 13,833 5,658 548 389,519
Netherlands 24,393 3,872,084 89,331 194 1,517 420 3,987,939
Portugal 20,147 87,385 57,204 1 9,369 10 174,116
Hungary 16,888 767,931 32,518 28,615 397 213 846,562
Czech Republic 14,462 2,443,655 81,988 113,524 16,989 153 2,670,771
Norway 14,161 129,777 7,009 6,669 1,493 746 159,855
Sweden 11,002 242,286 34,406 19 17,819 27 305,559
Belgium 10,450 2,494,023 56,863 184,119 36,234 4,229 2,785,918
Slovakia 7,370 718,799 20,657 12,510 4,424 44 763,804
Romania 6,587 1,329,120 7,343 537 17 1,343,604
Denmark 3,061 556,732 26,487 182 4,563 115 591,140
Finland 2,789 125,491 4,391 174 8,070 77 140,992
Malta 2,451 87,197 836 8 174 14 90,680
Lithuania 2,339 799,157 27,298 276,719 3,255 44 1,108,812
Estonia 1,574 339,518 2,442 2 254 0 343,790
Latvia 1,414 72,817 1,756 1,068 10 4 77,069
Bulgaria 1,247 955,647 22,302 121,554 61 0 1,100,811
Luxembourg 1,220 19,318 1,085 107 156 169 22,055
Slovenia 896 138,103 7,652 35,819 645 273 183,388
Liechtenstein 231 2,311 72 84 8 34 2,740
Iceland 36 15,736 3 1 11 0 15,787
Total 861,900 42,919,331 3,241,809 2,157,328 431,121 667,900 50,279,389
* The category “others” includes: aircraft, banknotes, boats, boat engines, containers, industrial 
equipment, licence plates, securities, vehicle registration documents.
Source: own elaboration of eu-LISA (2014b).
6 Twenty-eight countries are connected to SIS II. Member States of the EU connected to 
SIS II are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech, Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Associated Countries 
connected to SIS II are Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Moreover, the 
authorities of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Croatia are in the process of making 
preparations for their technical connection to SIS II.
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1.2 The architecture of the system and information searches
The system is an interconnection of a national database (N-SIS), via a secure 
communication infrastructure, with a central server in Strasbourg (C–SIS) that 
sends and receives data to and from the Member States (radial shape). Each 
Member State accesses the system through a common interface. The national 
database may contain a national copy of the data (Article 9 of the Regulation). 
However, this is not necessary. Access is guaranteed by the central system. During 
the interview, the SIS office clarified that in actual fact the biggest countries have 
a national copy for their own purposes.
When an alert needs to be entered, the N-SIS of a Member State sends the 
request to the central server. After checking the alert to verify its compliance 
with technical requirements, the C-SIS validates it and then enters it into both 
the national system and the C-SIS. Consequently the permanent updating of the 
central database and the uniformity of the national system are guaranteed. Each 
Member State adopts a security plan to guarantee the security of the system and 
if it has a copy of the data, the copy is under its own responsibility.
Information searches in each Member State only take place within that country’s 
N–SIS. The authorities of a country cannot search the N-SIS of another one. 
An N-SIS Office in each Member State is responsible for the operational 
management of the N-SIS. In addition, an office (called SIRENE, Supplementary 
Information Request at the National Entry) is established to provide additional 
information. Member States exchange information through the respective 
national SIRENE offices.
Figure No. 1 - The circulation of information in the system
Source: own elaboration based on collected information
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1.3 Right to access and retention period
Having outlined the architecture of the system and the types of data it contains, 
a subsequent important aspect is to define who is authorised to access the 
system and under which conditions. Access to the system refers to “a query - 
regardless of whether a hit is achieved or not - or to a transaction intended to 
create/update/delete (CUD) an alert. Every access is counted, even if an access 
resulted in an error and an error message was returned from the system (e.g. if 
the operator commits an error)” (eu-LISA 2014a). Access is granted on a “hit/
no-hit” basis. The searched object or person can be entered as a search query 
in order to obtain a yes/no answer. If the response is positive and the alert has 
been issued by the country performing the search, additional information can 
be searched through national databases. If the alert has been issued by another 
country, the SIRENE office of the country that did the search will contact 
the SIRENE office of the country that issued the alert to ask for additional 
information (see figure No.1 above).
According to the rules set forth in Article 27 of Regulation No. 1987/2006 
and in Article 40 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, the authorities that 
have access to the information entered in the SIS II must be identified by each 
Member State. As regards Third Country Nationals (TCNs), Article 27 of the 
Regulation gives the right to search data to the authorities responsible for the 
identification of TCNs for the purpose of border control and for other police 
and customs checks. In addition, the right to access data entered in SIS II is given 
to judicial authorities and to those issuing visas. In both cases access by these 
authorities is governed by national legislation.
The statistical report (eu-LISA 2014b) provides figures on the numbers of accesses 
from April to December 2013, distinguishing between manual and automated 
processes. As shown in the following table, few countries were able to provide 
separate figures for the number of manual and automated accesses. Belgium, 
Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden reported not using any 
automated data processing systems. Some countries (Estonia, Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Romania, Slovenia, Norway, and Switzerland) reported that they use automated 
data processing systems to a certain extent but that they cannot separate the data. 
The table also reveals notable differences between the various countries. It is 
hard to entirely understand these differences. Several countries that do not insert 
many alerts appear to use the system a lot. Other countries, especially Italy, enter 
a large number of alerts but do not access the system as frequently as others. It 
is also reasonable to suppose that not all countries understand the meaning of 
automated processes in the same way as no common definition is provided at 
EU level. Moreover a high number of automated processes could be related to 
the use of automatic licence plate readers. This could explain the high figure in 
countries with intense road traffic, such as Germany.
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Table No. 4 – Numbers of accesses to SIS II from April to December 2013
Country Manual processes Automated processes Total
1 SPAIN 343,655,015
2 GERMANY* 2,148,704 237,047,720 239,196,424
3 POLAND 128,744,291 0 128,744,291
4 ROMANIA 64,593,255
5 CZECH REPUBLIC 30,522,148 19,485,451 50,007,599
6 BULGARIA 3,038,194 45,266,498 48,304,692
7 SWITZERLAND 43,028,560
8 FRANCE 38,869,603 38,869,603
9 FINLAND 23,532,727 14,604,394 38,137,121
10 AUSTRIA 37,623,689
11 HUNGARY 36,161,651 0 36,161,651
12 NETHERLANDS 33,286,351 0 33,286,351
13 ESTONIA 28,477,900
14 ITALY 25,229,296
15 SLOVENIA 23,897,408
16 GREECE 21,982,593 1,473,291 23,455,884
17 LITHUANIA 22,559,080 22,559,080
18 LATVIA 14,681,460 14,681,460
19 SWEDEN 13,887,614 0 13,887,614
20 PORTUGAL** 6,988,878 6,988,878
21 BELGIUM 6,968,088 0 6,968,088
22 SLOVAKIA 3,903,002 1,449,740 5,352,742
23 NORWAY 4,728,876
24 DENMARK 2,727,000 1,500,000 4,227,000
25 MALTA 1,053,529 0 1,053,529
26 LUXEMBOURG 241,116 269,914 511,030
27 ICELAND 292,192 179,121 471,313
28 LIECHTENSTEIN 106,801 307,320 414,121
*Partial data, for CUDs only alerts and flags are counted ** Figures only for the second 
semester 2013
Source: eu-LISA (2004b)
The retention period is limited to the time required to achieve the purposes 
for which the alert was entered. In addition, the Member State has a duty to 
review the need to keep the alert after three years. A Member State “shall, where 
appropriate, set shorter review periods in accordance with its national law” 
(Article 29, Regulation No. 1987/2006).
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1.4 Implementation in Italy7
The authorities in charge of the Schengen Information System are the SIS Office 
and the SIRENE Office. In Italy these two offices are located at two different 
branches of the Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior.
The N-SIS Division is a branch of the Ufficio Coordinamento e Pianificazione delle 
Forze di Polizia (Coordination and Planning Office of the Police Forces). This 
Office performs several tasks, aimed at increasing the efficiency of the police 
forces and improving cooperation between them in Italy and between the Italian 
law enforcement offices and those of foreign countries.
The SIRENE Office is located at the Direzione Centrale per la Polizia criminale 
(Central Directorate of the Criminal Police). This Central Directorate 
coordinates police investigations at the national level, collects and analyses data 
on criminal phenomena and is in charge of the international cooperation with 
foreign countries aimed at fighting organised crime.
1.4.1 The interface
The police forces may access the SIS II database through the native interface or 
the SDI (Sistema Di Indagine) interface, which is the national police information 
system. Access is more frequent through the SDI because this is the commonly 
used police information system and offers more functionality than SIS II. The 
two databases are hosted on different servers but users can access the data in 
SIS II through the SDI interface, provided they have the appropriate privileges. 
Accessing the SDI and SIS II involves different authorisation procedures, and 
the authorisation of users to access SIS II is an exclusive competence of the 
N-SIS office. When law enforcement officers access the SDI interface, either to 
process or consult an alert, they enter or search the relevant information in the 
SDI and the system is able to link the information that has been entered or the 
search queries to the SIS II database. Thus, if the information entered in the SDI 
is relevant for the Schengen Information System, it is automatically copied in 
the SIS II databases. If the person or object searched in the SDI is also present in 
the SIS II, a link to the SIS II alert appears. This happens if the officers searching 
the system have the required level of authorisation, otherwise no information 
appears.  SDI and SIS II are interoperable as described in case of queries. For 
the operations of creation, update or deletion of an alert the two databases are 
interoperable only for objects and not for people.
7 The main sources of this part are the interviews carried out during the fieldwork.
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The flow of information is different if the alert has been issued by another 
country. When the officers need more information besides that included in the 
alert, they must contact the SIRENE Office of their own country and request 
an exchange of information.
1.4.2 The issuing of alerts under Article 24 of the Regulation
The reasons for issuing an alert differ from one Member State to another. Reports 
by the JSA8 and the 2013 eu-LISA report show a high level of discretion among 
Member States in issuing alerts. This is because Article 24 of the Regulation 
(and previously Article 96 of the CISA) provides the general framework but also 
allows National States considerable discretion.
Article 24 provides for the issuing of an alert in two situations: when a TCN 
has been subject to a measure involving expulsion, refusal of entry or removal 
that is accompanied by a re-entry ban and when a TCN could represent a threat 
based on the fact that s/he has been convicted in a Member State of an offence 
carrying a custodial sentence of at least one year or there are serious grounds 
for believing that s/he has committed (or intends to commit) a serious criminal 
offence.
National immigration laws regulate several aspects of expulsion and refusal of 
entry. Moreover, penalties for crimes or the reasons why a person could be 
defined as a threat to public policy or public security are a matter of State 
sovereignty. This results in different methods of enforcement across Member 
States. In Italy, the local Police authorities we interviewed affirmed that the alerts 
envisaged under Article 24(2) had never been implemented and that they had 
only ever issued alerts based on Article 24(3) (see table below).
8 Over the years, the JSA has carried out several inspections on the implementation of The 
Schengen Convention. See http://schengen.consilium.europa.eu/reports/inspection-
report.aspx?lang=en.
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Table No. 5 – Rules on the issuing of the alert for unwanted TCNs.
9
Article 96 Schengen Convention Article 24  
Regulation No. 1987/2006
Article 10  
Legislative Decree No. 286/19989 
 1.  Data relating to aliens who are 
reported for the purposes of being 
refused entry shall be included 
on the basis of a national report 
resulting from decisions taken, 
in compliance with the rules of 
procedure laid down by national 
legislation, by the administrative 
authorities or courts responsible.
2.  Decisions may be based on a threat 
to public order or national security 
and safety which the presence of 
an alien in national territory may 
pose. Such may in particular be the 
case with:
(a) an alien who has been 
convicted of an offence carrying 
a custodial sentence of at least 
one year;
(b) an alien who, there are 
serious grounds for believing, 
has committed serious offences, 
including those referred to in 
Article 71, or against whom 
there is genuine evidence of 
an intention to commit such 
offences in the territory of a 
Contracting Party.
3.  Decisions may also be based on 
the fact that the alien has been the 
subject of a deportation, removal 
or expulsion measure which has 
not been rescinded or suspended, 
including or accompanied by a 
prohibition on entry or, where 
appropriate, residence, based on 
non-compliance with national 
regulations on the entry or 
residence of aliens.
1.  Data on third-country nationals in 
respect of whom an alert has been 
issued for the purposes of refusing 
entry or stay shall be entered 
on the basis of a national alert 
resulting from a decision taken 
by the competent administrative 
authorities or courts in accordance 
with the rules of procedure laid 
down by national law taken on the 
basis of an individual assessment. 
Appeals against these decisions 
shall lie in accordance with 
national legislation.
2.  An alert shall be entered where the 
decision referred to in paragraph 1 
is based on a threat to public policy 
or public security or to national 
security which the presence of the 
third-country national in question 
in the territory of a Member State 
may pose. This situation shall arise 
in particular in the case of:
(a) a third-country national who 
has been convicted in a Member 
State of an offence carrying a 
penalty involving deprivation of 
liberty of at least one year;
(b) a third-country national 
in respect of whom there are 
serious grounds for believing 
that he has committed a serious 
criminal offence or in respect of 
whom there are clear indications 
of an intention to commit such 
an offence in the territory of a 
Member State.
3.  An alert may also be entered 
when the decision referred to in 
paragraph 1 is based on the fact 
that the third-country national 
has been subject to a measure 
involving expulsion, refusal of 
entry or removal which has not 
been rescinded or suspended, 
that includes or is accompanied 
by a prohibition on entry or, 
where applicable, a prohibition 
on residence, based on a failure to 
comply with national regulations 
on the entry or residence of third-
country nationals.
1.  The border police may refuse 
entry to foreigners who arrive 
at border posts without the legal 
requirements foreseen by this law.
2.  The refusal of entry is also ordered 
by the police authority for 
foreigners:
a) who are stopped at an entry 
point or immediately after 
entering the territory of the 
State while avoiding border 
controls;
b) who while being in the 
circumstance provided for 
under paragraph No.1, have 
been temporarily admitted on 
the grounds of public assistance 
needs.
3.  Should a carrier transport a 
foreigner to the national border 
without the required documents 
to enter the country, or a 
foreigner who must in any case be 
rejected, that carrier shall assume 
responsibility for immediately 
accompanying the foreigner back 
to the country that he or she came 
from.
4.  The measures provided for by 
article 10 commas 1,2,3 and 
article 4 commas 3 and 6 do not 
apply in those cases envisaged by 
the existing provisions regulating 
political asylum, recognition of 
refugee status or the adoption of 
measures of temporary protection 
for humanitarian reasons.
5.  The rejected foreigner shall be 
granted due assistance at national 
borders.
6.  All rejections shall be recorded by 
the border police. 
9 Decreto legislativo no. 286/1998 Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina 
dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero. Legislative Decree No. 
286/1998 Cosulated text of provisions on immigration legislation and norms on the 
foreigner status . Translation is by the author.
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In Italy, the only authority that can issue alerts in accordance with Article 24 
of Regulation No. 1987/2006 is the Immigration Office of the local Police 
Headquarters.10 This office is responsible for issuing the alert, and for its 
subsequent deletion or any amendments as required.
In Italy the reasons for issuing an alert ensue from the implementation of the 
rules set forth under EU Regulation No. 1987/2007, the Return Directive 
2008/115/EC as transposed into Italian law and Italian immigration laws. There 
is no national legal text that clarifies the reasons for issuing a SIS II alert. This 
complex legal framework made up of different European instruments and Italian 
legal rules is therefore subject to the interpretation of the local offices.
As regards alerts based on a removal measure (Article 24(3) Regulation), Italian 
immigration law does not provide for the issue of an alert as a consequence of 
a refusal of entry (Article 10 Legislative Decree No. 286/1998). This is because 
in the Italian legislation there is no ban on re-entry following a refusal of entry 
measure. In contrast, expulsion decisions are always accompanied by a ban on 
re-entry and consequently an alert is always issued. This difference in the rules 
is problematic, since Italian Immigration law envisages a specific type of refusal 
of entry, namely delayed refusal of entry, which is difficult to distinguish from 
expulsion.
Article 10 Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 provides for refusal of entry to 
migrants who are not entitled to stay within the territory of the Italian State. 
Delayed refusal of entry applies when migrants have avoided border controls and 
have been stopped upon entry or immediately after entering the country or are 
entitled to enter temporarily in order to be rescued. This is often the case with 
people entering Italy via Lampedusa or other areas of Sicily.11 This last reason for 
delayed refusal of entry overlaps with one of the reasons for expulsion — envisaged 
under Article 13(1)(a) Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 — in cases where migrants 
have entered avoiding border controls and have not been removed.
In actual fact, regardless of whether the persons were rescued or landed on their 
own, the authority has full discretionary power to choose between expulsion and 
delayed refusal of entry. The two procedures differ significantly; for the purposes 
of this discussion, expulsion implies the issue of a Schengen Information system 
alert whereas delayed rejection at the border does not.
10 Each province in Italy (there are 110 in all) has a police headquarters (“Questura”). Every 
Immigration office is responsible for the administrative decisions taken in respect of Third 
Country Nationals resident or present within the territory of the province.
11 Since the insurgence of the political crisis in the regions of North Africa, Italy has 
experienced a significant rise in the number of undocumented immigrants arriving from 
the coasts of North Africa by boat. Lampedusa and other areas in Sicily are the main places 
of arrival.
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If a case requires the issuing of an alert, Article 24(1) of the Regulation states 
that the decision to issue the alert has to be taken “on the basis of an individual 
assessment” (see table No. 5 above). This means that the authorities must always 
assess the concrete circumstances and evaluate whether or not the case warrants 
the issuing of a Schengen Information System alert (see Brouwer 2008b, Peers 
2011). On the other hand, this could be interpreted as meaning that the issuing 
of one alert for a group of people based on a collective decision (e.g., a collective 
expulsion order) is prohibited.
According to the lawyers interviewed, alerts are, however, issued automatically 
after an expulsion order. The authorities interviewed confirmed this. The 
existence of an expulsion order is a necessary and sufficient condition for issuing 
an alert.
In addition, Article 21 of the Regulation states: “Before issuing an alert, Member 
States shall determine whether the case is adequate, relevant and important 
enough to warrant entry of the alert in SIS II”. In practice, this proportionality 
assessment does not take place, since there is no discretionary power to issue an 
alert as a consequence of an expulsion order.
Both the individual assessment requirement and the proportionality clause 
therefore do not work as limitations for entering alerts in respect of TCNs. 
The issuing of the alert appears to be the consequence of a highly routinized 
procedure.
The retention period of alerts based on a removal measure (Article 24(3) of 
the Regulation) is calculated according to the length of the entry ban. In the 
interview the SIS office underlined that the retention period is calculated from 
the day on which the TCN leaves the Schengen territory (not just that of Italy). 
Thus, if there is no proof that the migrant has left the territory, the alert is 
maintained and renewed. This could partially explain the high number of alerts 
on persons in Italy.
1.4.3 Access to the database by the authorities
Access to the database depends on the type of alert and level of authorisation 
of the respective authority. All five Italian law enforcement bodies have access.12 
12 In Italy there are five national police forces under gouvernment control. Two are military 
police (Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) and three are civilian police (Polizia di 
Stato, Polizia Penitenziaria and Corpo Forestale dello Stato). The Polizia di Stato (State 
Police) is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior – Department of Public Safety, 
whereas the Carabinieri is under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Both are 
organised on a territorial basis and they have patrolling, investigative and law enforcement 
duties. The other three police forces have specific duties: the Guardia di Finanza (under 
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The city police only have access to vehicle registration data. The Foreign 
Affairs Ministry has access with the restriction described in Article 27(3) of the 
Regulation.
There is no national legislation regulating access to the databases. Decrees 
of the Chief of the Police establish who has access to the database. These are 
administrative acts, circulated internally. The list of authorities that have access to 
the database is not published but, in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation 
1987/2006, it must be sent to the eu-LISA, which will ensure its annual 
publication in the Official Journal of the EU13.
According to the authorities interviewed, there are 140,000 accounts with access 
to the Schengen Information System. Each access account refers to a name but 
not to a specific IP address; this means that the same person can have access from 
different computers. Data are not downloadable.
1.4.4 The right to information and the right of access, correction and deletion
According to Article 42 of the Regulation, Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive 
95/46/EC regulate the right to be informed when an alert has been issued 
in respect of Third Country Nationals for the purpose of refusing entry 
and stay, but there are some specific exceptions. The information must not 
be provided if the personal data have not been obtained from the TCNs or 
when provision of the information would involve a disproportionate effort or 
proves impossible. Moreover there is no right to information when the Third 
Country National already has the information or where “national law allows 
for the right of information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard 
national security, defence, public security and the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offence”. This leaves the doors open to a 
wide interpretation of these exceptions by the Member States. All the lawyers 
interviewed agree that most TCNs do not know anything about the alert, 
but they usually understand the meaning of the re-entry ban. Moreover, the 
the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance) deals with prevention and 
prosecution of currency, financial and tax related offences; the Polizia Penitenziaria 
(under the authority of the Ministry of Justice) is responsible of the management of penal 
facilities and correctional programs; the Corpo Forestale dello Stato (under the authority 
of the Ministry of Agriculture) has some specific competences for the environmental 
management of open spaces and national heritage. The Ministry of Interior, which is the 
branch of the government in charge of public security control, has authority over all the 
police forces.
13 The list of competent authorities which are authorised to search directly the data contained 
in the second generation Schengen Information has been published in the Official Journal 
2014 C 278, pp. 1-144, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:278:FULL&from=EN.
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information “shall be provided in writing, together with a copy of or a reference 
to the national decision giving rise to the alert” (Article 42(1) Regulation). 
According to the lawyers and the immigration officers interviewed, Third 
Country Nationals receive a copy of the decision that states the length of the re-
entry ban but provides no specific information about the Schengen Information 
System alert.
Both Article 109 of the CISA and Article 41 of the Regulation provide for 
the right of access, correction and deletion. The Italian Data Protection Act 
(Legislative Decree No. 196 of 30 June 2003) also establishes the rules for 
exercising these rights. The procedure is explained on the websites of the 
Ministry of the Interior and of the DPA.14
Since 1 January 2004 the right of access, correction and deletion has been exercised 
directly through the Ministry for Home Affairs - Public Security Department - 
SIS Office. Prior to that date, the data subject could exercise these rights through 
the Data Protection Authority, which had the duty to request information from 
the Ministry for Home Affairs. According to the lawyers interviewed, lawyers 
exercise the right of access when they need to know if the existence of an alert 
is hampering the possibility for the Third Country Nationals involved to receive 
a visa or a residence permit. Immigration lawyers seem not to consider data 
protection as a right that needs to be protected in itself. If the answer provided 
is unsatisfactory, data subjects may lodge a complaint with the Data Protection 
Authority. No complaint has ever been processed by the DPA.
According to the authority interviewed, the duty of information is the responsibility 
of the local authorities that issue the alert. The information is not centralised. 
The interviewees revealed that information about data protection aspects is almost 
never given. Expulsion orders always include information on the length of the ban 
on entry but nothing is written on the issue of a Schengen alert. 
In the experience of the lawyers, foreign nationals are rarely aware of the issued 
alert. It is difficult to say whether this is due to their not being informed, or 
whether they were informed but did not realise the content of the information 
they were given or perhaps simply forgot it.
In addition, the lawyers reported a lack of information when an alert is deleted. 
When they ask for an alert to be deleted they are not always informed that it 
has been erased. In practice, what happens is that the foreign national receives 
the residence permit that could not previously be issued because of the alert. 
14 The websites are available in Italian and English. See http://www.interno.gov.it/
mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/servizi/come_fare/banca_dati_delle_
forze_di_polizia/dati_schengen.html; http://www.garanteprivacy.it/home/attivita-e-
documenti/attivita-comunitarie-e-internazionali/cooperazione-in-ambito-ue/schengen.
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Consequently it is clear that the alert must have been cancelled or expired, 
although the lawyers did not receive any official communication in that respect.
1.4.5 The interlinking of alerts
The interlinking of alerts is a useful tool for policing purposes because it permits 
the identification of associations between persons or persons and objects, such 
as documents or vehicles. Consequently, the authorities can take action based 
not only on single persons but on their link to alerts issued for other people or 
objects. This appears to be a particularly sensitive issue for a database such SIS, 
which has a broad scope and a large number of alerts related to different reasons.
The purpose of an alert of a TCN as provided for under Article 24 should be 
limited to immigration control and the fight against illegal migration. In practice, 
linking two alerts adds a new and different purpose to the alert, compared to 
that for which it was originally issued: TCNs involved are now also targeted as 
“persons of interest” for investigative reasons. This appears to go beyond the 
scope of the alert ex Article 24. According to Article 37 of the Regulation, 
the link is based on national law and it should be used “when there is a clear 
operational need”.
The authorities at the central level underlined that this new functionality 
represents an investigative lead, but this does not in itself imply that there is “a 
clear operational need” to use SIS II in this way also as a database for policing 
purposes. There is a grain of truth in the statement, but this does not alter the 
fact that the data of thousands of undocumented migrants are in the database 
and can be used for other purposes, completely unrelated to that for which they 
were originally included, and thus affecting many people for whom there is no 
particular suspicion that they are involved in crimes.
Moreover, there are no legal rules on the criteria for issuing a link. The N-SIS 
only provides an operational manual that explains the meaning and the technical 
aspects of the alerts. This gives wide discretionary powers to the police authorities.
One of the two local immigration officers interviewed affirmed that they do not 
implement links or enter fingerprints into the database. However, this does not 
mean that the law enforcement officers do not collect these data. Fingerprints 
are included in other national databases. For example, the national AFIS database 
(Automated Fingerprint Identification System) stores fingerprints of all TCNs 
who apply for a residence permit, who are expelled and who are convicted of 
a crime. Moreover, the SDI database, which allows the addition of links and has 
more functionalities than SIS II, is used by the Italian police on a daily basis. It 
could therefore be argued that the full enforcement of a database that is more 
relevant at the international than at the domestic level is not yet regarded as a 
priority by some local police authorities.
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2. Eurodac
Eurodac is the oldest EU biometric database. It was established in 2000 
(Regulation No. 2725/2000) and became operational in 2003. Since then several 
proposals have been enacted by the Commission to comply with modifications 
in the common European asylum system and to extend access to new authorities. 
The present Regulation (No. 603/2013) is a revised version that takes these 
changes into account. It will come into force on 20 July 2015.
The original purpose was to help to establish which Member State is responsible, 
in accordance with the Dublin Convention, for the reception of asylum 
applications. Eurodac was introduced to avoid so-called “asylum shopping”, i.e. 
the risk that applicants submit several applications or travel across Europe in 
order to choose the Member State they prefer.
The 2013 Regulation adds a new purpose, described as follows: “This Regulation 
also lays down the conditions under which Member States’ designated authorities 
and the European Police Office (Europol) may request the comparison of 
fingerprint data with those stored in the Central System for law enforcement 
purposes” (Article 1(2), Regulation No. 603/2013)”. This will be discussed later 
on.
As for SIS II, the new European Agency eu-LISA is now in charge of the 
operational management of the database. Changes have also been made to the 
supervisory authority, which will bring it in line with the structure envisaged 
for SIS II. When the new Regulation comes into force, the Eurodac Supervision 
Coordination Group (composed of representatives from the DPAs of each of 
the participating states and the EDPS) will be replaced by the EDPS that will 
supervise all the data processing activities concerning the Eurodac. National 
DPAs will supervise the processing of data within the Member States.
2.1 The architecture of the system
The system consists of a computerised central fingerprint database (“Central 
System”) and a communication infrastructure between the Central System 
and Member States, which provide an encrypted virtual network dedicated to 
Eurodac data. Each Member State has a single national access point. In Italy 
the authority in charge of Eurodac is the Direzione Centrale Anticrime – Servizio 
di Polizia scientifica (Central Department of the Forensic Police). At the sub-
national level there are fourteen branches (Gabinetti Regionali di Polizia Scientifica 
– regional offices of the Forensic Police) which are the Eurodac focal points.
Data are entered into the system by the 14 focal points within the Italian 
territory through the national AFIS interface. This means that communicating 
with the central system is possible only from the central unit in Rome. In the 
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local branches, the fingerprints inserted locally are sent to the national AFIS 
system for searches, and then AFIS gets back in real time with a list of possible 
matches. In the case of a hit, the central office in Rome enters the new data in 
Eurodac. And if there is no hit, a new file is created in AFIS. Then, the central 
office in Rome inserts the new fingerprints in the Eurodac system.
When hits occur (i.e. the fingerprints are already in the system because the 
person has already asked for asylum in another Member State), the Member 
States involved are likely to exchange additional data via a system called 
‘DubliNet’. The data that are exchanged include the individual’s name, date of 
birth, nationality, photos, and even information about his/her family and address.
2.2. Types of data stored and retention period
The new Regulation, like the previous one, defines three categories of people 
whose data can be stored in the system:
- Category 1: applicants for international protection over 14 years old;
- Category 2: TCNs or stateless persons over 14 years old apprehended in 
connection with the irregular crossing of an external border;
- Category 3: TCNs or stateless persons over 14 years old found illegally 
staying in a Member State, with the aim of checking whether the data 
subject has previously lodged an application for asylum in another 
Member State.
The data stored are specific for each category and the retention period varies. 
The table below summarises the new provisions, which contain just a few 
changes compared to the previous Regulation. 
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Table No. 6 – Data stored in Eurodac
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Data stored -  fingerprint data (all ten 
fingers)
-  MS of origin, place and 
date of the application for 
international protection
-  sex
-  reference number used by 
MS of origin
-  date on which the 
fingerprints were taken
-  date on which the data 
were transmitted to the 
Central System
-  operator user ID
-  dates related to transfers, 
removals or other specific 
movements of the persons 
according to Article 10*
-  fingerprint data (all ten 
fingers)
-  MS of origin, place and 
date of the application for 
international protection
-  sex
-  reference number used by 
MS of origin
-  date on which the 
fingerprints were taken
-  date on which the data 
were transmitted to the 
Central System
-  operator user ID*
No data storage. 
Fingerprint data may be 
transmitted to the Central 
system in order to check 
whether a person has 
previously lodged an 
application for international 
protection
Transmission of data to 
the Central System
Within 72 hours + 
additional 48 hours in 
specific cases (under the 
previous Regulation there were 
no rules)
Within 72 hours + 
additional 48 hours in 
specific cases (under the 
previous Regulation there 
were no rules)
Retention period 10 years from the date the 
fingerprints were taken
18 months (under the 
previous Regulation it was 
2 years)
data shall not be recorded
Erasure of data As soon as the State 
becomes aware of:
-  acquisition of citizenship;
As soon as the State 
becomes aware of :
-  acquisition of citizenship;
-  issuing of a residence 
permit;
-  departure from the MS
N.A.
Marking of data When a MS grants 
international protection, the 
applicant’s record will be 
marked. The marked data will 
be available for three years 
for law enforcement purposes, 
as laid down in Article 1(2). 
Upon the expiry of the three 
year period the data will be 
blocked and then erased, when 
the retention period expires.
* Info in italics was not included in the previous Regulation.
Source: Own elaboration of legal texts.
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As the table above shows, under the new Regulation, when TCNs receive 
international protection,15 their data are not erased but marked so that they can 
be used for law enforcement purposes for three more years. Under the previous 
regulation, data of persons recognised as refugees16 were blocked and hits 
concerning them were not transmitted. As soon as the retention period expired, 
the data were erased. The regulation made no provision for asylum seekers who 
were recognised as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
Allready stated, data are entered in the system by the 14 focal points within the 
Italian territory through the national AFIS-interface (Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System). Due to the specificity of recent immigration flows, this 
activity is most extensively performed by the focal points in the South of Italy, 
mainly in Sicily, where the number of people apprehended while unlawfully 
crossing the country’s border is highest. Since the beginning of the recent 
operation called Mare nostrum17 migrants’ fingerprints have also been taken 
immediately on board of the search and rescue ships. Live scan fingerprints is the 
technology used in the offices and on board of ships.
As shown in the table below, at the end of 2013 2,378,008 data sets were stored 
in the Eurodac Central System. Data differ between countries due to geographic 
or geopolitical reasons (see the high number of Category 2 data in Italy and 
Greece) and rules on granting residence permits and citizenship that allow 
erasure. Moreover, as underlined in the 2013 Eurodac annual report, levels of 
blocked data vary among Member States, several of which are working in order 
to comply with the Regulation18 (eu-LISA 2014a, 11). In fact the number of 
data sets that were blocked increased from 16,573 in 2012 to 56,013 in 2013.
15 Under the new Regulation this rule applies to any type of international protection (from 
refugee to subsidiary protection).
16 There were no rules for other types of international protection. Consequently the data 
remained in the system.
17 See http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx.
18 The report underlines: “In several cases (in Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, 
Latvia, Malta, Norway and Slovakia) fewer than 10 data sets had ever been blocked since 
Eurodac became operational in 2003, whilst in Germany, Sweden and the UK the figure 
was in the tens of thousands. In most cases where very few data sets had been blocked, 
the Member States informed the Commission that they intended to undertake projects 
to apply the Eurodac Regulation correctly in future as well as to conduct retrospective 
corrections. France informed the Commission that they would need to block around 
110,000 cases, which would require a fifteen-month project to complete. Having each 
blocked 0 cases in 2012, in 2013 Belgium blocked 8,072 data sets, Cyprus blocked 15, 
France blocked 4,417, Greece blocked 76 and Norway blocked 16,640 (which, they 
explained to the Commission, included historic cases that had previously not been 
blocked). Slovenia blocked 91 and Slovakia blocked 59 – both appearing to have resolved 
their previous problems concerning the blocking of data” (eu-Lisa 2014a, 11).
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Table No. 7 - Numbers of data sets in Eurodac on 31.12.2013
Category 1 Category 2 Blocked Category 1
FRANCE 359,742 796 4,247
GERMANY 334,535 122 19,405
UNITED KING-
DOM 256,692 456 29,712
SWEDEN 219,594 0 23,408
ITALY 189,400 33,883 3,208
BELGIUM 152,615 16 7,972
GREECE 121,315 28,888 76
AUSTRIA 118,177 197 7,463
NETHERLANDS 90,384 30 4,714
SWITZERLAND 82,625 4 5,897
NORWAY 76,601 89 16,558
POLAND 52,128 48 556
SPAIN 32,895 7,645 489
HUNGARY 32,659 1,688 302
CYPRUS 30,272 52 14
FINLAND 24,687 7 1,062
DENMARK 22,953 0 0
IRELAND 21,666 8 966
SLOVAKIA 16,187 64 59
CZECH REPUBLIC 14,935 0 434
BULGARIA 10,217 9,856 12
ROMANIA 8,419 52 622
MALTA 8,096 58 70
LUXEMBOURG 7,652 2 9
SLOVENIA 3,793 48 98
LITHUANIA 2,122 5 57
PORTUGAL 1,632 1 29
LATVIA 784 0 0
ICELAND 478 0 0
CROATIA 335 38 0
ESTONIA 283 1 32
LIECHTENSTEIN 81 0 0
TOTAL 2.293.954 84.054 127.471
Source: eu-LISA 2014a
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Besides the above-mentioned changes, there are some relevant new provisions 
regarding the rights of data subjects and the rights of law enforcement authorities 
to access data.
2.3 The rights of law enforcement authorities to access data
For the new purposes that have been added under the 2013 Regulation, in 2015 
Europol and the law enforcement authorities of the Member States will have 
access to the database for comparing fingerprint data with the data stored in 
the Central System. According to Article 20, Member States’ law enforcement 
authorities can only gain access if the search in other databases did not lead to 
the establishment of the identity of the data subject. The mentioned databases are 
national fingerprint databases, other Member States’ databases, accessible through 
the network of national DNA databases established by the Prüm Decision 
(2008/614/JHA) and the Visa Information System (VIS) database.
In addition, access has to be: 
1) “necessary for the purpose of the prevention, detection or investigation of 
terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences” which means that there 
is “an overriding public security concern which makes the searching of the 
database proportionate”;
2) “necessary in a specific case”, which means that systematic comparisons are 
not allowed;
3) based on reasonable grounds to consider that the comparison will substantially 
contribute to the prevention, detection or investigation of any of the criminal 
offences in question.
As outlined in the table above, this right of access includes the right to access 
the fingerprints of people granted recognition as asylum seekers for three years.
The law enforcement authorities with power to access such data are designated 
at Member State level and, according to Article 5 of the 2013 Regulation, must 
be authorities that are “responsible for the prevention, detection or investigation 
of terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences”.
2.4 The rights of the data subject
Article 29 of the 2013 Regulation establishes the rules governing the rights of 
the data subject. It replaces Article 18 of the 2725/2000 Regulation, adding 
some new obligations for data controllers. This is a consequence of the findings 
of the inspection carried out by the Eurodac Supervision Coordination Group 
in 2009. The inspection identified a need for a general improvement in the 
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quality of information given to the data subject. In particular, it reported that 
asylum seekers (Category 1) are provided with better information than illegal 
border crossers (Category 2). Some Member States give information in writing, 
others only orally. Information on data protection is generally included in the 
information regarding the whole asylum procedure, and no attention is paid to 
providing this information in an accessible and understandable language. Finally 
the moment the information is given differs among Member States (see Eurodac 
Supervision Coordination Group 2009).
In Italy, the leaflet refers to the provisions under Article 18 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2725/2000, and specifies the data controller, the purpose for which his/
her data will be processed in Eurodac, and the right of access to data. Moreover, 
the authority responsible for the information to be given to the person whose 
fingerprints are taken is the Central Directorate for Immigration and Border 
Police, Border and Immigration Police Service, and to be more precise, the 
Police Headquarters (Questura) at local level. It is not the Forensic Police to 
be responsible for these aspects. However, it is worth noticing that none of the 
interviewed lawyers have ever seen the leaflet, not even once.
The 2000 Regulation did not set out any rules on the form of information, 
whereas the 2013 Regulation stipulates that a person must be informed “in 
writing, and where necessary, orally, in a language that he or she understands or 
is reasonably supposed to understand”. Moreover a common leaflet, clear and 
simple, written in a language that the person concerned can understand (or is 
reasonably supposed to understand) has to be drawn up in such a manner as to 
enable Member States to complete it with additional Member State-specific 
information.
The content of the information given and the right to access, correct and delete 
data are the same as those envisaged under the 2000 Regulation. It is worth 
underlining that the above-mentioned inspection report refers to very few 
requests to access data submitted by data subjects. Moreover it stated that “in 
general the countries where such requests are being presented are the same ones 
in which the information which is being provided to data subjects is deemed to 
be complete, adequate and in compliance with Eurodac Regulation” (Eurodac 
Supervision Coordination Group 2009, 15). During the interview, the Italian 
DPA stated that they have never received any requests.
2.5 Successful transactions and hits
The annual report on the activities of Eurodac shows the number of so-called 
successful transactions, namely data transactions, which have been correctly 
processed, without rejection due to a data validation issue, fingerprint errors or 
insufficient quality.
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This number represents the times a Member State has sent fingerprint data to 
the system and the data were successfully processed by the system. As the table 
clearly shows, the use of Eurodac increases, albeit not steadily. However, in the 
last 3 years the number of transactions has grown significantly. 
Table No. 8– Successful transactions from 2003 to 2013
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cat. 1 246,902 232,205 187,223 165,958 197,284 219,557 236,936 215,463 275,587 285,959 354,276
Cat. 2 7,857 16,183 25,162 41,312 38,173 61,945 31,071 11,156 57,693 39,300 48,276
Cat. 3 16,814 39,550 46,299 63,341 64,561 75,919 85,554 72,840 78,753 85,976 106,013
Total 271,573 287,938 258,684 270,611 300,018 357,421 353,561 299,459 412,033 411,235 508,565
Hits indicate matches. When a hit occurs it means that the searched fingerprints 
were already in the system. There are three categories of hits:
- Cat. 1 against cat. 1, asylum seekers’ fingerprints against asylum seekers’ 
fingerprints. This shows how many migrants have repeatedly applied 
for asylum in the same country (local hits) or in another one (foreign 
hits);
- Cat. 1 against cat. 2, asylum seekers’ fingerprints against those of persons 
apprehended while irregularly crossing an external border. This shows 
how many persons who irregularly crossed the border later lodged an 
asylum application and where they did so;
- Cat. 3 against cat. 1, fingerprints of irregular migrants found in a 
Member State against asylum seekers’ fingerprints. This shows how 
many irregular migrants previously requested asylum and where.
According to the data published by eu-LISA (2014a), Italy is the country with the 
highest number of hits. This means that when other countries enter fingerprints 
and find a match, the data are already in the system because the same fingerprints 
have already been entered by Italy.19
19 10 % of the hits on cat. 1 against cat. 1 and on cat. 3 against cat. 1 and about 50% of hits 
on cat. 1 against cat. 2 are Italian.
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3. Current and forthcoming developments
Several databases and information-sharing schemes are currently under 
implementation or discussion, besides SIS II and Eurodac. All of these instruments 
have a twofold objective: to improve border management and counter serious 
crime. None of them have the exclusive aim of border control (with the sole 
exception of API, the Advanced Passenger Information system). Almost all of 
them have multiple purposes, either from the outset or having acquired more 
purposes during their development or implementation, and are aimed at 
managing borders, fighting serious crimes and enhancing judicial cooperation. 
Some of the schemes involve exchange of data with third countries, others 
explicitly forbid this exchange.
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide an overview of all of these, but 
it is worth underlining the main features of some of them, as they have many 
characteristics in common with SIS II or Eurodac or are closely linked to the 
Italian context.
The first database, already in an advanced phase of implementation, is the Visa 
Information System (VIS),20 which allows the exchange of data between Member 
States on short-stay visas. Like SIS II and Eurodac, the architecture of this system 
is composed of a central database, a national interface and a communication 
infrastructure between the Central VIS and the national interfaces. In particular 
SIS II and VIS share the same communication system and system for processing 
biometric data. Operational management is performed by eu-LISA. The EDPS 
and the respective national DPAs supervise the system.
The VIS has a very broad purpose. It aims to improve the implementation of 
the common visa policy, consular cooperation and consultation between central 
visa authorities by facilitating the exchange of data between Member States on 
applications and decisions, in order to:
(a) facilitate the visa application procedure;
(b) prevent the bypassing of the criteria for the determination of the Member 
State responsible for examining the application (i.e. asylum shopping);
(c) facilitate the fight against fraud;
(d) facilitate checks at external border crossing points and within the territory 
of the Member States;
20 VIS has a dual legal basis, formerly falling under the first and third pillars: Regulation No. 
767/2008, concerning the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas 
and Council Decision 2008/663/JHA concerning access by several authorities for the 
purposes of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist and other criminal offences.
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(e) assist in the identification of any person who may not, or may no longer, 
fulfil the conditions for entry to, stay or reside in the territory of the 
Member States;
(f) facilitate the determination of the Member State responsible for an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States;
(g) contribute to the prevention of threats to the internal security of any of 
the Member States (see Article 2, Regulation No. 767/2008).
It clearly links the implementation of the common visa policy with security 
interests of the EU and its Member States.
The database contains ten fingerprints,21 as does Eurodac, and a digital photograph 
of the visa applicant along with data provided in the visa application form.22
Visa authorities are the only authorities allowed to enter the relevant information 
but a wide range of authorities can have access for consultation (from the border 
control authorities and those performing checks within the country to the 
designated authorities of the Member State for the purposes of the prevention, 
detection and investigation of terrorist offences or other serious offences). 
Searches may be performed for the purposes of verification and identification. 
Verification consists of checking that the fingerprints scanned at the border 
crossing point correspond to those associated with the biometric record attached 
to the visa. Identification consists of comparing the fingerprints taken at the 
border crossing post with the contents of the entire database.
Similarly to SIS II and Eurodac, the VIS envisages the rights of data subjects to 
information, access and deletion.
Similar to the VIS are the databases proposed in the Smart Border Package.23 
This package was proposed by the Commission in February 2013 with the 
21 Article 9, Regulation No. 767/2008 refers to the Common Consular Instructions that 
require the fingerprints of all ten fingers to be taken.
22 These data include: surname, name, sex, date, place and country of birth, current nationality 
and nationality at birth, type and number of the travel document, the authority which 
issued it and the date of issue and of expiry, place and date of the application, type of visa 
requested, details of the person issuing an invitation and/or liable to pay the applicant’s 
subsistence costs during the stay, main destination and duration of the intended stay, 
purpose of travel, intended date of arrival and departure, intended border of first entry or 
transit route, residence, current occupation and employer; for students: name of school, in 
the case of minors, surname and first name(s) of the applicant’s father and mother (Articles 
9,  10, Regulation No. 767/2008). When the visa is issued further data concerning the visa 
will be added. 
23 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20130228_01_
en.htm
Iv. border conTrol: a new fronTIer for auTomaTed decIsIon makIng and ProfIlIng?
118
aim of introducing a higher level of automation of border control. The package 
contains three proposals: one establishing an Entry-Exit System (EES), another 
implementing a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) and a third one 
introducing the consequently needed modification in the Schengen Border 
Code.
The EES, modelled on the US-VISIT system,24 registers the time and place of 
entry and exit of all TCNs who travel to the European Union for a short stay. 
Its aims are:
- to calculate the authorised stay of TCNs admitted for a short stay;
- to assist in the identification of any person who does not fulfil the 
conditions for entry or stay on the EU territory;
- to enable authorities of the Member States to identify overstayers25 
and take the appropriate measures (The proposal does not specify the 
measures to be taken. They could amount to a fine or the issuing of an 
expulsion order);
- to gather statistics on the entries and exits of TCN for analysis.
The total amount of border crossings has been identified in 887 million by 
2025 (see EC 2014). The aim of the RTP is to speed up border crossing for 
frequent, pre-vetted, pre-screened TCNs, who are estimated to about 9 million 
by 2025 (see EC 2014). This registered traveller programme would be voluntary 
and under the payment of a fee. The successful applicants will receive a token (a 
machine readable card with a unique identifier) that allows entering and exiting 
the border through the Automatic Border Control (ABC) gates.
Both of these proposed new systems will collect alphanumeric and biometric 
data. Like SIS II, they will be under the operational management of eu-LISA and 
they will share the same communication and biometric data processing systems.
Specifically relevant for the Mediterranean area is EUROSUR (European Border 
Surveillance System), which became operational in December 2013. Its aim is 
to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation between Member 
States and Frontex26 and - in certain cases and on the basis of bilateral and 
24 The US-VISIT system is rather controversial, in particular because it does not seem to 
succeed in collecting biometric exit data (for details see Koslowski 2005, Koslowski 2007, 
Jeandesboz et al. 2013).
25 Those who enter the EU with a valid travel document but then become unlawful migrants 
because they do not leave the EU territory when their authorisation to stay expires.
26 Frontex is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. It was established by 
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multilateral agreements - with third countries. The purpose of the exchange of 
information is the empowerment of the “ability to monitor, detect, identify, track 
and understand illegal cross-border activities in order to find reasoned grounds 
for reaction measures on the basis of combining new information with existing 
knowledge, and to be better able to reduce the loss of lives of migrants at, along 
or in the proximity of, the external borders” and the “ability to perform actions 
aimed at countering illegal cross-border activities at, along or in the proximity 
of, the external borders” (Article 3, Regulation No. 1052/2013). Information 
is obtained from several sources (national border surveillance systems, sensors, 
patrol activities, drones, etc.) and is collected and analysed in order to obtain 
pictures of the situation organised in three different layers:
- an events layer, which contains events such as unauthorised border 
crossings, detected cross-border crimes, suspect objects or persons, crisis 
situations;
- an operational layer, which contains information on the authorities 
involved in border activities and on weather conditions;
- an analysis layer, which contains information such as indicators, risk 
analysis and maps. In the proposed version of the regulation it also 
includes migrant profiles.
The purpose of EUROSUR is not to collect personal data but it could result in 
more collection and processing of personal data than originally foreseen, given 
the wide range of information collection activities and the use of advanced 
technologies such as drones and smart cameras. Moreover EUROSUR is one 
of the surveillance systems that will be interoperable within the Common 
Information Sharing Environment (CISE)27 in the EU maritime domain. The 
aim of the CISE system, which is currently under development, is to enhance 
the exchange of information between national authorities and EU agencies 
on maritime surveillance. Flows of migrants to the Schengen Area via the 
Mediterranean Sea are one of the areas of interest (for details see the recent 
COM 2014 451 final28).
Regulation No. 2007/2004.
27 See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/
index_en.htm.
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
Better situational awareness by enhanced cooperation across maritime surveillance 
authorities: next steps within the Common Information Sharing Environment for the 
EU maritime domain.
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4. Discussion: some reflections on profiling and automated decision 
making in the context of Italian border control
The EU databases and in general the use of technology in border control have 
been analysed from several points of view. In particular, the lack of transparency 
in the decision making process and the lack of democratic control over these 
information systems have been underlined by several authors (Parkin 2011, 
Brouwer 2008a, Petermann et al. 2006). Although this fieldwork did not analyse 
these aspects, its findings do confirm a lack of information and understanding 
among the experts, in particular lawyers, who work in the field of immigration. 
The lawyers interviewed seem to take data protection issues into consideration 
when problems arise which affect the possibility of their clients to stay in the 
country. None of them ever consider data protection as a right in itself that 
needs to be enforced. This may be due to the disciplinary segmentation of these 
professionals. Lawyers that deal with data protection issues do not deal with 
immigration and vice versa.
Besides this lack of awareness among experts, the results of this fieldwork 
revealed that data protection rights are clearly established on paper but not fully 
enforced in practice. TCNs are often unaware that their data are being collected, 
even when this is done according to the law; they are not properly informed 
about the fact that they are being registered, what this registration implies and 
how they can dispute it. Moreover, data are collected lawfully but the purpose 
of their collection and use changes over time. New authorities have access to the 
data, the retention of data is extended and new purposes are added that justify 
the use of previously collected data. In conclusion, it would not appear to be an 
exaggeration to say that the essence of data protection principles is undermined 
by these databases.
In general, these databases allow the storage of a huge amount of information 
about a growing number of people or objects and aim to make it easier for 
countries to exchange information. However, the findings of this fieldwork have 
underlined that the effective implementation of all of their functions (such as 
the addition of fingerprints and links between alerts) has not yet been achieved. 
Bureaucracies need time to implement new functions and this appears to be 
one of the biggest obstacles to their effectiveness. Somehow the delays of the 
State bureaucracy in adapting to the new functionalities involuntarily protect the 
rights of the persons whose data are stored in these databases.
Notwithstanding this, the addition of new functions (in the case of SIS II) and 
new purposes (both for SIS II and Eurodac), and the features of forthcoming 
databases (EES and RTP), have blurred the distinction between border 
control, counter terrorism, the fight against transnational crimes and migration 
management.
This trend is strictly related to the power of the law enforcement authorities at 
Profiling Technologies in PracTice
121
EU (Europol) and Member States level to access data.
The original collection of data for a well-defined and narrow purpose has been 
combined with further storage for new purposes. The clear-cut example is 
Eurodac. This database, originally created to better implement asylum policy, will 
store data about persons who have been granted refugee status and grant access 
to law enforcement agencies. It appears clear that these data will not serve the 
original purpose (to identify the competent State for the asylum procedure) but 
rather plant a seed of suspicion as to the motives of people asking for international 
protection (innocent and even vulnerable people) whose data are stored with a 
view to fighting future crimes, even though there is no indication that those 
people whose data have been withheld will ever commit a criminal offence.
The original nature of SIS II has also changed. From being a tool to guarantee the 
enforcement of the Schengen Agreement, it is slowly moving towards becoming 
a tool for investigative purposes. This transformation is now at the embryo stage. 
But an extensive interlinking of alerts and the collection of fingerprint data in a 
format that allows comparison will modify the present – certainly limited – use 
of the database. The VIS, RTP and EES clearly have a multi-purpose nature and 
this clearly indicates that the trend is towards multi-purpose databases.
Moving closer to the specific issue of this chapter, all the EU databases (existing 
and forthcoming) share the common feature of being tools aimed at classifying 
people (i.e. TCNs and travellers) into various categories, whose access to rights is 
differentiated. The aim of this classification is to make it easier to control borders, 
or better to say, control mobility of the target population.
Those identified as trusted travellers (and who will be included in RTP databases 
in the future) will be granted the highest degree of mobility and given the green 
light, thanks to previous checks, which will allow them to be included in the 
databases.
Those with criminal records or bans on entry to EU territory will be given the 
red light. They are the Third Country Nationals included in SIS II.
Those whose motives are questionable, whose data are requested and held for 
future use, get the amber light. This is the case for those whose data are entered 
in the EURODAC database and those who apply for a visa. All such TCNs are 
looked upon as possible troublemakers, and their data are kept well beyond the 
time needed for the administrative and purely migration-management purposes 
for which they were collected. Amber is also the colour assigned to potential 
overstayers who will be included in the forthcoming EES.
As already suggested in the introduction, owing to this differentiation, these 
databases are the perfect tool for regulating personalised borders, where controls 
can be performed at multiple sites because the border is embodied in the traveller.
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In order to be efficient, this personalisation certainly finds a good ally in 
automated decision making and profiling systems.
The databases in their current forms contain some traces of automated decision 
making. In the daily use of SIS II it appears clear that law enforcement officers 
enter the alert without any individual assessment. The alert is the automatic 
consequence of the administrative act of expulsion.
Moreover the new function of the interlinking of alerts represents a fruitful tool 
for profiling purposes. It allows the assessment of the person to be performed 
on the basis of the links between that person and other people and/or objects.
The evolution of border control databases over the last ten years has shown 
the information stored in these databases to be of a rather dynamic character. 
Information that might have been gathered for a very limited purpose can be 
turned into valuable knowledge when combined with other data or when used 
for different purposes. This is clearly the case for the extension of access to law 
enforcement officers.
Moreover, the EUROSUR system and the CISE, currently under development, 
are clearly directed towards the exchange of information with the aim of building 
new knowledge from the available information.29
Automated profiling is certainly not a common practice in the present use of 
databases but the classification of the population according to different risk levels 
through the creation of new databases and the development of new information 
exchange schemes makes border control an area of increasing interest for 
profiling and automated decision making.
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